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POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO
PROTECT THE UNDERSEA CABLE SYSTEM
Kevin Frazier

The protection of the undersea cable system, which carries the vast majority of the
world’s Internet traffic, requires a new policy approach from the United States
government. Old vulnerabilities and new threats have placed this critical piece of
international infrastructure under increased threat of disruption and sabotage. Old
vulnerabilities include the inherent difficulties associated with defending cables
that lay along the open seafloor across international waters and the fragility of the
cables themselves--often no larger than a garden hose. New threats come from
climate change and changes in geopolitics. For example, Russia, among other
nations, has made investments in offensive military equipment tailored to breaking
undersea cables.
Though disruptions to Internet traffic through the undersea cable system can be
diverted to satellites, that alternative comes with significant financial and temporal
costs. Therefore, proactive policies to prevent cable breaks should receive
substantial attention from political leaders. The weeks and millions of dollars
required to repair broken cables further justify the prioritization of proactive
policies to reduce the frequency of breaks.
This article explores why current international and domestic laws and policies
meant to protect undersea cables fall short of what is needed to ensure the longevity
and security of the undersea cable system. After an analysis of these various laws
and policies, the article offers a series of steps the Biden Administration can take
to improve the resilience of the undersea cable system, at least the parts of it
connected to the United States.

These steps make theoretical sense and have received support from policy leaders
on this topic--actually taking the steps, though, will require significant political
capital. The majority of the undersea cable system is owned and operated by private
stakeholders. The protection of the system necessitates extensive collaboration
between private and public stakeholders. Because collaboration takes time and
trust, this article comes at a critical moment -- it can help direct political energy
toward this time-sensitive endeavor.
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I.

Introduction – A Vulnerable, Critical System

Picture this hypothetical: in the dark cloud of night, several Russian
submariners prep for a world-changing mission. Covered by an even darker sea,
the submarines sail west to the coast of California; more specifically, the
submarines target a small slice of the coast—the approximate 200 miles between
Morro Bay and Redondo Beach in which seventeen different undersea cables lay
unprotected on the ocean floor. 1 After decades of investment in its Pacific Fleet, 2
the Russian government is ready to reap a return in the form of disrupting the
Internet.

FIGURE 1: Depiction of the undersea cables off the coast of California.3
Once in place, the submarines begin their operation. Designed to perform
technical work on the ocean floor, these machines are equipped for the task at

1

TELEGEOGRAPHY (visual count of cables taken on Jan. 22,
2021), https://www.submarinecablemap.com/multiselect/landing-point?ids=morro-bay-ca-unitedstates,redondo-beach-ca-united-states,hawaii-kai-hi-united-states,lurinperu [https://perma.cc/9Q38-FMJV].
2
Peter Suciu, Russia's Pacific Fleet Is Getting Stronger. Here's Why That Matters, NAT’L
INT. (June 2, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-pacific-fleet-getting-strongerheres-why-matters-159506 [perma.cc/9HCC-QSDM].
3
Marine Cadastre National Viewer, OFF. COASTAL MGMT. (Jan. 22,
2021), https://marinecadastre.gov/nationalviewer/.
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hand:4 cutting the undersea cables—not that it is especially hard given that the
cables are comparable in size to garden hoses.5
The small breaks in each of the cables amount to large disruptions to
Internet access at both ends of the cables—the contiguous United States, where
the cables launch, and the respective end destinations of the cables, including
Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, and Peru. 6 Internet service continues in each of
these places but at much slower speeds. The undersea cable system is fairly
redundant7—meaning that multiple cables often land at a single destination to
prevent a single cable break from causing too much disruption.8 However, a
geographically-specific attack such as this one would force more Internet traffic
to travel through satellites because the redundancy of the system would become a
bug, rather than a feature. The high number of cables in close proximity would
allow for a few submarines to knock out many cables. The resulting shift in traffic
would result in lower quality, less reliability, less security, and more expensive
Internet service.9 Undersea cables, made up of fiber optic cores, “transfer data
five times faster than satellites [and] do so at a vastly lower cost,” according to
Rishi Sunak, British Parliamentarian and author of a report on undersea cables. 10
With Americans tweeting, albeit with less speed, about their sluggish
Internet, the USNS Zeus, the U.S. Navy’s lone cable repair ship, 11 mobilizes . . .
Magnus Nordenman, Russian Subs Are Sniffing Around Transatlantic Cables. Here’s What to
Do About It, DEF. ONE (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/01/russian-subsare-sniffing-around-transatlantic-cables-heres-what-do-about-it/145241/.
5
NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF,
AND DEPENDENCE ON, UNDERSEA CABLES 1 (Nov.
2019), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/11/Undersea-cables-Final-NOV-2019.pdf [hereinafter
CCDCOE].
6
TELEGEOGRAPHY, supra note 1.
7
See Garrett Hinck, Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables, LAWFARE BLOG (Mar. 5,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-russian-threat-undersea-cables
[https://perma.cc/63R3-7XRQ] (outlining the redundancy of the undersea cable network by
pointing out that “[c]utting the United States off from the rest of the world would require severing
a large number of cables: at least 18 in the North Atlantic alone . . .”).
8
Id.
9
THE COMMUNICATIONS SEC., RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL IV, WORKING
GROUP 8 SUBMARINE CABLE ROUTING AND LANDING 1 (Dec. 2014),
https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/csric4/CSRIC_IV_WG8_Report1_3Dec2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39ZA-AABG] [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT].
10
RISHI SUNAK, UNDERSEA CABLES: INDISPENSABLE, INSECURE 13 (Dec. 1,
2017), https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Undersea-Cables.pdf.
11
See Hinck, supra note 7 (noting that “Congress authorized $250 million for a new ship that can
lay and repair cables” in the U.S. defense authorization bill for fiscal 2018).
4
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from Norfolk, Virginia . . . to respond to the threat in California. 12 Public and
private actors demand a more expedient solution but receive an unsatisfactory
response because the Navy has not outlined a plan for defending undersea
cables.13 Ultimately, the United States Federal Government calls on the
International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) for assistance. The ICPC,
whose 170 members account for ownership of 97 percent of the world's undersea
telecom cables,14 coordinates a fleet of undersea cable repair ships. After several
weeks and more than $17 million in repair costs,15 the cables are restored.
This hypothetical is not far from reality. In 2008, an accidental cable break
in the Mediterranean Sea diminished the reliability and quality of the Internet to
such an extent that the United States military had to scale back its drone
operations in the Middle East by an order of magnitude.16 Similarly, when a cable
connected to Vietnam failed in 2017, Internet customers in Ho Chi Minh briefly
lost connectivity.17 Intentional breaks of cables have also wreaked havoc on some
nation states while advancing the aims of others and affiliated non-state actors.18
As flagged by the think tank Chatham House and reported by the BBC, Ukrainian
telecom providers noticed disruptions to an essential Internet exchange point as
well as to cable connections in the midst of Russia’s military action in the
Crimean Peninsula in 2014.19
The under-discussed importance and vulnerability of the undersea cable
system merit increased attention from, and action by United States policymakers.
Society’s increased reliance on the Internet justifies addressing the vulnerabilities
of the system.20 Additionally, absent action in the short-run, other activities in the
12

See generally Voyage information of USNS Zeus, MARINETRAFFIC,
https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:5430967/mmsi:367212000/imo:793240
8/vessel:ZEUS#:~:text=ZEUS%20(IMO%3A%207932408)%20is,her%20width%20is%2022.25%
20meters (documenting the various locations of the USNS Zeus, some of which are on or beyond
the eastern coast of the United States) (last visited Nov. 7, 2021).
13
Hinck, supra note 7.
14
INT’L CABLE PROT. COMM., https://www.iscpc.org/ [hereinafter ICPC] (last visited Nov. 7,
2021).
15
CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that it may take “several weeks and cost in excess of one
million USD for a repair to be completed”).
16
Hinck, supra note 7.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Chris Baraniuk, Could Russian submarines cut off the internet?, BBC (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34639148 [https://perma.cc/25U6-R6HX] (quoting a
representative of Chatham House as saying, “[Russia] can interfere with internet infrastructure in
order to gain [complete] control of [the information available in] specific regions”).
20 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
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sea will make future efforts to remedy the system even harder; increased
exploration and exploitation of the seabed, for instance, is bringing new
stakeholders into the proverbial arena and threatening to crowd out the interests of
undersea cable operators.21
This paper contains six sections: a discussion of the importance of the
undersea cable system to the Internet, an overview of the sources and severity of
risks to that system, an assessment of the adequacy of the various legal
frameworks and industry standards related to the system, a review of actions by
other public and private actors to protect the system, an examination of the
shortcomings of United States law and policy related to the system, and a
proposal for policy responses by the United States.
Several issues are outside the scope of this paper. The impact of the
undersea cable system on marine life and ecosystems will go uncovered. An
authoritative report produced, in part, by the ICPC reports that the “laying of
[undersea cables] on the surface of the ocean floor has a minor if not negligible
one-off impact.”22 Nevertheless, some of the solutions discussed in Section VII
may benefit marine life and ecosystems. Those secondary benefits will be left to
others to fully examine.23 This paper will also not provide a thorough examination
of the issues related to cybersecurity and espionage associated with the undersea
cable system. The decision to avoid these topics is based on the difficulty of
eavesdropping via undersea cables and the ease of other means to accomplish the
same objective.24
This paper instead is focused on raising awareness around the
vulnerability of the undersea cable system during a time, in the midst of the
COVID-19 pandemic, when Internet access is more important than ever. 25
21

Id. at 3.
CARTER ET AL., SUBMARINE CABLES AND THE OCEANS: CONNECTING THE WORLD 37 (UNEPWCMC Biodiversity Series No. 31 2009).
23
See, e.g., Kingsley Ekwere, Submarine Cables and the Marine Environment: Enhancing
Sustainable and Harmonious Interactions, 2016 CHINA OCEANS L. REV. 154, 161 (2016).
24
See, e.g., Richard Chirgwin, Spies need superpowers to tap undersea cables, THE
REGISTER (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.theregister.com/2014/09/18/spies_arent_superheroes/
[https://perma.cc/N9QQ-FUFW] (discussing the dangerous and resource intensive steps required
to safely and effectively tap an undersea cable, noting that few nations possess the submarines
requisite for such an activity, and pointing out three far easier means to get the same sort of
information).
25
Jessica Poiner, In the midst of coronavirus, connectivity matters more than ever, OHIO GADFLY
DAILY (July 23, 2020), https://fordhaminstitute.org/ohio/commentary/midst-coronavirusconnectivity-matters-more-ever [https://perma.cc/6JEZ-4B99].
22
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Furthermore, this paper aims to motivate action from Federal Government
stakeholders in the wake of the transition to a new presidential administration; this
transition presents an opportunity to reassess the current United States legal and
policy approaches to the protection of the undersea cable system.
The paper will reveal the following conclusions: first, the protection of the
undersea cable system is essential to a functioning Internet and, therefore, the
economy, culture, and governance; second, intentional attacks by state and nonstate actors and unintentional breaks by commercial actors pose the two greatest
threats to the system; third, international law inadequately addresses those threats;
fourth, United States domestic law also insufficiently addresses those threats; and,
fifth, the United States Federal Government can most effectively and efficiently
reduce the likelihood of those threats occurring and the severity of damage those
threats could cause by partnering with the owners of the cables themselves to
implement policy solutions.

II.

The Undersea Cable System is Essential to a Fast and Reliable
Internet

Undersea cables are foundational to a safe, reliable, and global Internet.
Upwards of 97 percent of all Internet traffic travels on undersea cables. 26
“Submarine cables,” as reported by The Working Group of the Communications
Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council, “provide the principle
domestic connectivity between the contiguous United States” and its offshore
states and territories (see Figure 2).27 As of 2014, Internet cables carried more
than 95 percent of United States Internet traffic, a percentage that is almost
assuredly higher as of this writing. 28 Most of these cables have a series of fiber
optic cables at their core; these cables are hair-thin strands of glass that allow for
data to travel as wavelengths of light at speeds of approximately 180,000 miles
per second.29

26

CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 1.
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
28
Id.
29
SUNAK, supra note 10, at 14.
27
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FIGURE 2: Undersea communications cables as of 2009.30
The private and public sectors rely almost exclusively on privately-owned
cables to carry their Internet traffic. The importance of these cables to private and
public interests qualifies them as “critical infrastructure” according to the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE).31 Regular or
persistent disruption to these cables could undermine modern society’s ability to
function.32 The destruction of or disruption to an undersea cable may cut an entire
area off from the Internet. Whether that area remains connected depends on the
number of redundant cables and the existence of alternative routes for the Internet
traffic, such as satellites. 33 What’s more, as the number of people with Internet
access increases around the world, the integrity of the cables will grow in
importance due to the increase in the amount of data that will travel through the
cable system.34
Despite the fact that undersea cables “carry the vast majority of civilian
and military U.S. Government traffic, [as of 2014] the U.S. Government does not
own and operate its own submarine cables.” 35 The Federal Government has laid
some of its own cables;36 nevertheless, a Harvard report revealed that the agency
30

CARTER ET AL., supra note 22, at 11.
CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 1.
32
Id. (comparing the cables to the “central nervous system” of the global Internet).
33
See id. at 2.
34
Id.
35
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
36
Hinck, supra note 7 (stating that the Pentagon has “publicly acknowledged [laying its own]
cables connecting Miami to the naval base at Guantanamo Bay”).
31
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responsible for the Department of Defense’s Internet networks depends on
privately-owned cables for 95 percent of their strategic communications—
indicating continued government reliance on private cables to carry even the most
sensitive data.37 This reliance on the undersea cable system means that “[d]amage
to [the system] can pose grave risks to U.S. national security and the U.S.
economy.”38 The number of cables running along the United States coastline
further increases the importance of the integrity of the system to the United States
military. Within the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and outer
continental shelf (OCS) of the United States there are at least 55 in-service
submarine cable systems and at least a dozen have been proposed or are currently
under construction.39 These cables represent potential targets for foreign states,
and non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.40
Private-sector entities likewise rely on the undersea cable system for fast,
reliable Internet. “[A]n estimated $10 trillion in financial transfers and vast
amounts of data pass through the seabed routes” on a daily basis.41 The
importance of the Internet to the economy has drawn the capital of some of the
world’s largest and most powerful companies. Though telecom carriers previously
owned the majority of cables, their share of the system has decreased because of
the entrance of Internet content providers, such as Facebook and Google, into the
cable-laying business.42
Absent the undersea cable system, the public would experience slower
Internet speeds.43 Internet traffic routed through satellites is lower in quality, less
reliable, less secure, and more expensive. 44 Consider that modern-day cables are
engineered to the same “five-nines” standard as nuclear weapons and space
shuttles—a standard which means they are reliable 99.999 percent of the time.45
For all of its benefits, some aspects of the undersea cable system can raise the
consternation of the public. Residents of a small town on the Oregon coast, for
example, have decried Facebook's placement of a cable landing station (“CLS”)
37

Id.
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
39
Id. at 1.
40
See generally id. at 2 (discussing how critical infrastructure is for both civilian and military
purposes in the United States).
41
Tim Johnson McClatchy, Undersea Cables: Too Valuable to
Leave Vulnerable?, GOVTECH (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.govtech.com/network/UnderseaCables-Too-Valuable-to-Leave-Vulnerable.html [https://perma.cc/A3AU-7S4B].
42
CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 1.
43
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
44
Id.
45
SUNAK, supra note 10, at 15.
38
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in the community.46 Notwithstanding issues related to the land-based
infrastructure of the undersea cable system, the public experiences tremendous
benefits from the system.

III.

Two Types of Threats Must be Addressed to Secure the
Undersea Cable System

The physical characteristics of the undersea cables make them susceptible
to intentional and unintentional disruption. Cables that connect continents or lands
divided by open water rest on the ocean floor. 47 The average diameter of these
cables is comparable to that of a garden hose. 48 The planned commercial lifespan
of the cables is 25 years, though they often get used for longer periods of time.49
Closer to the coast, the cables often have external steel wire rods for protection
and, in some cases, are placed up to two meters beneath the surface. 50 CLS are
also susceptible to natural and human-based threats, though threats to these sites
will not be discussed here.
Most experts regard the breakage rate of undersea cables as “rare” given
the scale of the system;51 there are about 100 undersea cables breaks per year.52
Though “rare,” the frequency of breaks incentivizes cable owners as well as those
reliant on cables to lay additional, seemingly redundant cables to increase the
resiliency of the cable system. 53
The high costs of repairs and difficult logistics of those repairs also
incentivizes cable system owners to protect cables and lay extra ones. Timely
repair of cables necessitates “ready and unfettered access for cable ships and
equipment to the ocean surface, water column, and seabed around a submarine
Nigel Jaquiss, Mark Zuckerberg Is Despoiling a Tiny Coastal Village and Oregon’s Natural
Treasures. The State Invited Him., WILLAMETTE WEEK (Aug. 19,
2020), https://www.wweek.com/news/2020/08/19/mark-zuckerberg-is-despoiling-a-tiny-coastalvillage-and-oregons-natural-treasures-the-state-invited-him/ [https://perma.cc/G57P-Y3KY].
47
CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 1.
48
Id.
49
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
50
See id.
51
Id. (regarding the frequency of damage to submarine cables as “rare”); See
also McClatchy, supra note 41 (estimating an average of 200 failures along cable routes per year
along approximately 650,000 miles of active international commercial cables).
52
CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 2.
53
See id.; see also Hinck, supra note 7 (outlining the redundancy of the undersea cable network by
pointing out that “[c]utting the United States off from the rest of the world would require severing
a large number of cables: at least 18 in the North Atlantic alone . . .”).
46
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cable.”54 Obtaining such access requires extensive coordination and cooperation
mechanisms, including, but not limited to, “cable spacing and crossing standards,
cable awareness programs and outreach, coordinating with other users of marine
and coastal areas, and marine special planning.”55 Cable ships need a lot of room
in order to complete their repairs.56 Objects such as “oil platforms, turbine towers,
[and] submerged structures” all frustrate the timely repair of cables. 57

FIGURE 3: “Diver Checking Underwater Protection of Cable”58
Unintentional events in waters shallower than 200 meters account for the
majority of cable breaks.59 Unintentional breaks include those caused by natural
forces as well as some human-caused breaks.60 Natural events, such as
earthquakes along the Pacific Rim, regularly break undersea cables. 61 The
54

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Driver Checking Underwater Protection of Cable (photograph), in The Official
CTBTO Photostream, FLICKR (Aug. 13,
2009), https://search.creati9vecommons.org/photos/b9d8b72a-3cb5-4405-a55c-b0c6a047ba17.
59
CARTER ET AL., supra note 22, at 39.
60
Id.
61
See, e.g., Winston Qiu, Submarine Cables Cut by Taiwan Earthquake and Typhoon
Morakot, SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORKS (Mar. 19, 2011),
https://www.submarinenetworks.com/news/cables-cut-after-taiwan-earthquake-2006.
55
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unintentional byproducts of human actions, such as commercial fishing activities
including anchoring and fishing, are the most frequent cause of undersea cable
breaks.62 For example, in 2012, a ship off the coast of Mombasa accidentally
dropped its anchor on the East African Marine System (TEAMS), a cable laid by
the Government of Kenya to increase its connectivity to the rest of the Internet. 63
As a result, six African nations saw the normal flow of Internet traffic drop by 20
percent; the repair time was estimated to be three weeks, while costs were
forecasted to reach $500 million.64 This sort of damage and disruption, though, is
not typical of the regular breaks that occur from unintentional breaks.65

FIGURE 4: Types of cable breaks recorded between 1959 and 2000.66
Given that commercial activity causes the majority of cable breaks, any
meaningful effort — be it legal or extralegal — to protect the undersea cable
system must address these events. As the TEAMS example makes clear, the
randomness of these commercially-induced breaks does not make for a
straightforward policy response to reduce their frequency. The rarity of natural

62

See CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 2.
Curt Hopkins, Ship’s anchor cuts Internet access to six East African countries, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Feb. 29, 2012), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0229/Ship-s-anchorcuts-Internet-access-to-six-East-African-countries.
64
See id.
65
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 2; CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 2.
66
Matthew P. Wood & Lionel Carter, Whale Entanglements with Submarine Telecommunication
Cables, 33 IEEE J. OCEANIC ENG’G 445, 446, fig.1 (2008).
63
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events causing breaks means that these events ought not to significantly influence
policy decisions.67
A policy designed to ensure the integrity of the undersea cable system
should also consider the threats posed by undersea cable system attackers. These
actors have clear ample reason to target the undersea cable system as a means to
injure an adversary. By way of example, an adversary who intentionally broke
specific cables along the United States coast could “cause a significant network
disruption that could hamper a United States military response in the opening
hours of a major war,” at least according to a former deputy director of the
National Security Agency. 68 It appears as though nations such as Russia are
increasingly investing in the resources necessary to cause such breaks.69
Non-state actors may also intentionally interfere with undersea cables for
non-political reasons. The Vietnamese military responded to one such incident
when local officials permitted fishermen in town to harvest copper from old
cables off the Vietnam coast. 70 When doing so, the fishermen attempted to take
resources from newer cables as well. 71 The resulting damage to the undersea cable
system caused 82 percent of the Internet traffic to drop in the short run and, in the
long run, cost US $5.8 million to restore to normal service. 72 Whatever motive
instigates the intentional breaking of a cable, these deliberate and geographicallyspecific attacks can significantly disrupt Internet service.
Intentional threats, then, have the potential to be more disruptive than the
more-frequent unintentional, commercial threats. That is precisely why policies
focused on ensuring the integrity of the system should prioritize responding to
intentional attacks and unintentional, commercial threats—the former is more
disruptive, and the latter is more common.
67

Not only are unintentional, natural events causing breaks infrequent, they are also more
predictable. For instance, a nation may identify that a typhoon is coming and, to the extent
possible, ready its private and government cable repair ships. Intentional breaks are likewise
infrequent, but their unpredictability renders them a greater threat to the integrity of the undersea
cable system because no such advanced preparation can take place.
68
Hinck, supra note 7.
69
Id.
70
Mick P. Green & Douglass R. Burnett, Security of International Submarine Cable
Infrastructure: Time to Rethink?, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 557, 561–62
(Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2008).
71
Id. at 562.
72
MICHAEL SECHRIST, CYBERSPACE IN DEEP WATER: PROTECTING UNDERSEA COMMUNICATION
CABLES BY CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP, BELFER
CTR. 123 (Mar. 23,
2010), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/PAE_final_draft_-_043010.pdf.
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IV.

Current Legal and Extralegal Frameworks do not Sufficiently
Address the Threats to the Undersea Cable System

The international and national laws pertaining to the undersea cable
system are outdated and insufficient.73 Industry standards meant to coordinate the
actions of the private cable owners also fall short. 74 These insufficiencies are not
because of a lack of awareness surrounding the importance of the undersea cable
system. Going as far back as 1884, undersea cables have received special
protection under international laws.75 Since then, international law pertaining to
the cables has not substantially progressed. Some nations have opted to fill in the
blanks left by the international regime; these efforts, though, have limited efficacy
so long as the international regime fails to empower nations to take proactive acts
to protect their cables, especially in international waters. This paper will not
perform a full exploration of these laws, customs, and standards. Instead, this part
will focus on the law as it is understood and applied today, particularly from the
perspective of the United States.
Which laws, customs, and standards apply to the undersea cable system
depends on the distance of the cable from the relevant coastal state. 76 Intuitively,
as the distance from the coastal state increases, the legal rights of that coastal state
diminish.
The first legal zone, the one most proximate to the coastal state, is the
territorial sea.77 According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), “[t]he sovereignty of a coastal State extends . . . to an adjacent
belt of sea,” known as the territorial sea.78 Every State has the right to exercise
such sovereignty in the seas within 12 nautical miles of their coast. 79

73

See UNCLOS DEBATE, U.S. underseas cable industry needs UNCLOS protection,
https://www.unclosdebate.org/argument/708/us-underseas-cable-industry-needs-unclos-protection
(last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
74
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 45–46.
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Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884 [hereinafter “1884
Convention”]; CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 4 (outlining some provisions of the Convention for the
Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables).
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See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter “UNCLOS”] (establishing a legal framework for all marine and
maritime activities).
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Id. at art. 2, ¶ 2.
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Id.
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The next legal zone is the EEZ, which may not extend further than 200
nautical miles from the coastal State. 80 In this zone, “all States enjoy the freedom
of laying submarine cables . . . and other internationally lawful use of the seas
related to this freedom, such as the operation of submarine cables,” writes
Kingsley Ekwere, Senior Lecturer at the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria. 81
The next legal zone is the continental shelf, which typically is up to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the relevant coastal State.82 In this zone, all
States may lay submarine cables. 83 Furthermore, no coastal State may interfere
with the laying and maintenance of such cables in this zone.84 To reinforce the
importance of allowing all States to lay and repair cables in this zone, UNCLOS
mandates that States have “due regard to cables . . . already in position.” 85
Additionally, the “possibilities of repairing existing cables . . . shall not be
prejudiced.”86
On the high seas, the next zone, consideration of coastal State jurisdiction
comes to an end because “[t]he high seas are open to all States,” per Article 87 of
the UNCLOS.87 In this zone, coastal and land-locked States have the freedom to
lay submarine cables. 88
a. UNCLOS Fails to Mitigate Threats to the United States’
Cables Because of Omissions in the Text of the Treaty and the
Fact that United States is not a Formal Party to the Treaty
Even if the United States were a party to UNCLOS, the treaty would fall
short of addressing the intentional and unintentional commercial activities most
likely to cause significant disruption to the Internet. Firstly, UNCLOS sets too
high of a threshold for what sort of activity can be punished. UNCLOS also does
not empower States to take proactive action; the treaty’s ambiguities and
omissions leave some States wondering if their policy responses are permissible
under international law.89 Secondly, it is important to stress that because the
majority of breaks take place within waters shallower than 200 meters, an
Id. at art. 57.
See Ekwere, supra note 23, at 165 (2016) (referring to art. 58, ¶ 1 of UNCLOS).
82
UNCLOS, supra note 76, at art. 76, ¶ 1.
83
Id. at art. 79, ¶ 1.
84
Id. at art. 79, ¶ 2.
85
Id. at art. 79, ¶ 5.
86
See id.
87
See id. at art. 87(1).
88
See id. at art. 87(1)(c).
89
See id. at art. 112–15.
80
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international regime focused on deeper waters will have only limited efficacy
with respect to protecting the undersea cable system. 90
UNCLOS specifically addresses injuries, intentional or not, to submarine
cables in Articles 113, 114, and 115. 91 The former, as interpreted by the
CCDCOE, “implies that the breaking or injury of a cable need only be punished
under domestic law if it is ‘liable to interrupt or obstruct . . . communications.’”92
This condition on interruption or obstruction means that attempted cable-breaking
may not be punishable under Article 113. The Article has also been interpreted as
allowing espionage based on the requirement for disruption to communication;93
this interpretation could facilitate more intentional cable attacks. The Article also
fails to specify that warships have the right to board vessels in international
waters suspected of attempting to intentionally damage undersea cables; the result
is that naval powers struggle to deter vessels from conducting attacks on cables.94
Article 114 specifies that States shall adopt laws to ensure that persons
who “cause a break in or injury to another cable . . . bear the cost of the repairs.” 95
Article 115 provides that States shall create laws to ensure that owners of ships
who sacrifice an anchor, net, or other form of fishing to save a submarine cable
are indemnified by the owner of the cable, so long as “the owner of the ship has
taken all reasonable precautionary measures beforehand.”96 Note, however, that
the indemnity does not include lost profits or catch. 97 This omission discourages
fishermen from sacrificing their equipment, especially if they think that the cable
break will not be attributed to them; they would rather increase the odds of
keeping their catch, then face the certain losses associated with giving up
equipment and more. This omission fails to adequately deter unintentional,
commercial breaks. Furthermore, Articles 114 and 115 are contingent on States
passing domestic legislation regarding the activities in question;98 this presents
another barrier to their enforcement.

Wood & Carter, supra note 66, at 448.
UNCLOS, supra note 76, at art. 113–15.
92
See CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 3 (quoting Article 113, UNCLOS).
93
See id. at 4 (tapping an undersea cable would not stop Internet traffic, but merely allow an
unintended third party to review that traffic as well).
94
SUNAK, supra note 10, at 17.
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UNCLOS, supra note 76, at art. 114.
96
Id. at art. 114–15.
97
See DOUGLAS R. BURNETT & LIONEL CARTER, INTERNATIONAL SUBMARINE CABLES AND
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protection zones as “generally comply[ing] with UNCLOS.”).
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The failure of UNCLOS to explicitly cover the extent to which its
provisions pertain to non-state actors represents another gap in the treaty. Though
UNCLOS refers to “States,” a few scholars have read the term to encapsulate the
private actors, such as those who control the vast majority of undersea cables. 99
Still, some scholars have interpreted UNCLOS as requiring national legislation
for private actors to exercise the freedom to lay undersea cables.100 Though
international treaties generally do not apply to private parties, the exclusion of
such parties is unacceptable in the context of an undersea cable system that is
almost exclusively privately-owned.101
Other gaps in UNCLOS necessitate action by States to protect undersea
cables. Robert Beckman, Director of the Center for International Law at the
National University of Singapore, stated the protections afforded by UNCLOS to
submarine cables in the high seas, in EEZs, and on continental shelves are
“clearly inadequate.”102 The CCDCOE identified two such inadequacies. First, it
is unclear if UNCLOS extends legal authority to States to create cable protection
zones intended to safeguard the integrity of the undersea cable system.103 This is
problematic given that these zones are designed to prevent the unintentional,
commercial breaks in relatively shallow water that account for such a high
percentage of 104 Second, it is it is unclear if attempted damage to an undersea
cable falls within the provisions of UNCLOS.105 Note, however, that some
stakeholders regard the prohibition against the infliction of damage to cables as a
matter of customary law. 106 Third, UNCLOS fails to cover “the intentional theft
of submarine cables in maritime zones outside of sovereignty.” 107 That’s why

99

3 MYRON NORDQUIST ET AL., UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A
COMMENTARY, 264 (Martinus Nijhoff et al. eds., 1995).
100
See RAINER LAGONI, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SUBMARINE HIGH VOLTAGE DIRECT CURRENT
(HVDC) CABLES 12–13 (1998).
101
See ICPC, supra note 14.
102
ROBERT BECKMAN, SUBMARINE CABLES–A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT BUT NEGLECTED AREA OF
THE LAW OF THE SEA 13 (2010), https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/BeckmanPDF-ISIL-Submarine-Cables-rev-8-Jan-10.pdf.
103
See CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 5; see also BECKMAN, supra note 102, (citing Article 21(1)(c)
of UNCLOS and noting that “UNCLOS gives coastal States the power to impose restrictions on
the right of innocent passage in order to protect submarine cables.”); BURNETT &
CARTER, supra note 97, at 21 (referring to cable protection zones as “generally comply[ing] with
UNCLOS.”).
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ICPC, supra note 14; infra Section V.
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See CCDCOE, supra note 5, at 3.
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TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 252–
53 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter “TALLINN MANUAL 2.0”].
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See BECKMAN, supra note 102, at 15.

15

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 13

Beckman calls on States to take it upon themselves to fill in the blanks left by
UNCLOS;108 some of his suggestions will be discussed in Sections V and VII.
The textual and scholarly analysis of UNCLOS reveals that it does not
adequately address the two key threats identified in Section III. If UNCLOS
definitively permitted cable protection zones, especially beyond sovereign seas,
then States would have greater authority to reduce problematic commercial
activity in more territory. The monitoring associated with enforcing cable
protection zones, covered in more detail below, would likely also deter actors
aiming to intentionally damage cables. These attackers would similarly be
deterred by UNCLOS penalizing attempted damage of cables and by UNCLOS
applying universal jurisdiction over breaking or attempting to break cables.
However, universal jurisdiction to enforce those proposed provisions is unlikely
because of the arduous process required to amend UNCLOS; any amendment to
UNCLOS has to be ratified or acceded to by at least 60 State parties. 109 Even
when that threshold is met, the amendment only enters into force for those who
accept the amendment. 110 Shortfalls notwithstanding, UNCLOS marks an
improvement on the prior reliance on customary law to protect the undersea cable
system.
UNCLOS, amended or not, can only have a marginal effect on protecting
the undersea cable system from the perspective of the United States. The nation
has not ratified UNCLOS.111 Consequently, scholars such as James Kraska of the
U.S. Naval War College argue that the United States is missing out on an
opportunity to have a more stable legal framework when acting in the continental
shelf and beyond.112 After all, UNCLOS and related conventions were developed
in direct response to the uncertainties associated with customary law—“practices
considered legally required by most nations,” as defined by David B. Sandalow in
a policy brief for the Brookings Institution 113—to govern the oceans. Despite the
United States Senate opting not to sign UNCLOS, President Reagan issued an
Ocean Policy Statement indicating the nation’s intent to generally follow the
Convention.114 Sandalow notes that President Reagan’s intentions, as good as they
108
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may have been, still do not afford the United States all of the benefits made
available to nations that have formally ratified UNCLOS.115
b. Other Sources of International Law and Norms Offer Only
Limited Protection to the United States’ Cable System Due to
Being Outdated or Non-binding
Because the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it may cite prior
international agreements when seeking to protect the undersea cable system. 116
For instance, the United States may still invoke the Convention for the Protection
of Submarine Telegraph Cables (1884 Convention).117 The United States, as
interpreted by the Working Group, regards the provisions of the 1884 Convention
as customary law guaranteeing to all states “unique freedoms to lay, maintain, and
repair submarine cables.”118 The 1884 Convention, though, provides
comparatively fewer protections than UNCLOS; “[t]he [1884 C]onvention,” as
stated by the CCDCOE, “only focuses on undersea cables located in the high
seas.”119 The 1884 Convention does make it a punishable crime “to break or
injure a submarine cable, willfully or by culpable negligence, in such a manner as
might interrupt or obstruct telegraphic communication.”120 However, the effect of
this provision is limited because the 1884 Convention does not apply to situations
of armed conflict; thus making it less responsive to threats posed by actors
seeking to intentionally damage cables.121
This review of international law, as it pertains to the United States, reveals
that the nation can only marginally rely on those conventions to combat threats to
the undersea cable system. Ultimately the United States has a limited range of
legal options from international law to reduce the occurrence of unintentional,
commercial threats to the system and to stem the likelihood of actors intentionally
attacking the system.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 represents another international agreement that
shapes norms pertaining to the undersea cable system. Developed by the
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCE) within the North
115
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Manual sets forth that customary
international law prohibits the infliction of damage to an undersea cable; however,
this prohibition would not apply in an armed conflict.122 According to Garrett
Hinck, the writers of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 have specified that States have the
right to create cable protection zones within their territorial seas, but beyond that
“there is no equivalent clear norm with respect to either the EEZ or continental
shelf, and certainly not for the high seas.”123
Notwithstanding the guidance the Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides, it has
limited legal value. The Manual is not binding, but rather it "must be understood
only as an expression of the opinions of the two International Groups of experts as
to the state of the law," as expressed in the document's introduction. 124 Members
of NATO are not bound by the Manual; the Manual does not even reflect NATO’s
official policies.125 Instead, the Manual is thought of as a restatement of
international laws related to cyberspace, informed by a broad range of
international law scholars.126
In sum, the Manual does not formally bolster the means by which the
United States can reduce unintentional, commercial activity and combat actors
intentionally targeting cables.
c. Private Actors Have Proactively Tried to Respond to the
Threats to the Undersea Cable System but Lack the Authority
and Capacity to Fully Mitigate the Threats
Industry norms help fill some of the holes left by international
agreements—especially in the context of unintentional, commercial activity. The
ICPC, for instance, has offered several recommendations to reduce the
vulnerability of the system. Sample recommendations include specifying the
proper distance between cables, outlining the criteria for crossing cables and
pipelines, and standards for repairing and installing cables. 127 Several countries
have opted to make ICPC standards a formal part of their undersea cable
governance. China and the United Kingdom, by way of example, have followed
122
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ICPC standards and identified specific minimum separation distances to protect
submarine cables.128
The North American Submarine Cable Association (NASCA) has also
taken steps to support the undersea cable system. NASCA runs cable awareness
programs that share the route position list data with commercial fishermen and
government agencies; this list has the location information of undersea cables as a
way to reduce anchoring- and fishing-related risks to the undersea cable
system.129 Representatives of NASCA further contribute to the security of the
undersea cable system through presentations on policy ideas related to increased
protection.130
Regional committees (such as NASCA) have stepped in to fill regulatory
and legal gaps. These committees formed in the late 1990s and early 2000s in
response to a “boom” in the undersea cable industry, as labeled by Robert Wargo,
who served as President of NASCA.131 Committees generally formed on a
regional and as-needed basis; for instance, the Oceania Submarine Cable
Association formed in 2010 and disbanded in 2011. 132 Committee memberships
have typically included power and telecommunications cable owners, operators
and suppliers; some also featured regulators and government officials. 133 As a
result of insufficient government regulations, the committees formed, in part, “to
ensure that no cable owner agreed to permit conditions that were technically
infeasible and would then need to be agreed to by all others seeking approval at
the same time.”134 Wargo noted that the committees also filled a gap left by ICPC
in resolving local or domestic problems.135 The United States is not a formal
member of NASCA nor of any specific regional committee; 136 therefore, these
outlets do not currently present an opportunity for a centralized response to the
main threats to the undersea cable system in the United States.
Not all industry collaboration has necessarily advanced the integrity of the
undersea cable system. Case in point, NASCA did not support efforts by the
128
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Canadian government to group underseas cables and pipelines, even identifying
the efforts as inconsistent with Canadian law and historical practices.137 NASCA
representatives have also exploited jurisdictional differences in regulations among
states in the United States to pass “cable friendly” provisions.138

V.

The United States Should Learn from the Undersea Cable Laws
of Other Nations to Better Protect its own Portion of the System

Because of the inadequacies of UNCLOS, in particular, and the
international legal and regulatory environment, in general, there is a need for
affirmative action by the United States to protect the undersea cable system.
Notably, the United States is not alone; according to Beekman “the laws and
regulations of most states on the protection of submarine cables are
inadequate.”139 A few states, however, have taken meaningful action against the
two main threats. Laws and regulations adopted by Australia, New Zealand, and
Sweden offer templates for the United States to consider. 140
Due to the substantial number of cables along the US and the nation’s
complicated federal system, there is no peer country to study with respect to
undersea cable policy. For instance, the policy lessons learned from New Zealand
are of limited value because the country has fewer cables than the United
States;141 similarly, China’s approach to undersea cable protection is of limited
value to the United States because of the centralized structure of China’s
government and its more uniform approach to coastal and ocean law. 142
Consequently, the United States will have to glean only the most applicable
lessons from other countries addressing the threats to the undersea cable system.
Australia and New Zealand created cable protection zones that prohibit
certain activities from occurring around undersea cables. Australia created the
first such zones in 2007.143 In consultation with industry stakeholders, Australian
authorities created zones near Sydney which prohibit activities of the highest risk
137
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to cables such as “sea-bottom trawl fishing, anchoring, sand-dredging and
dumping.”144 Zones may only be created around cables that are of national
significance.145 In the case of the first zones, each contained “nationally
significant high-capacity cables linking Australia to global communications
systems,” as described by the Australian Communications and Media Authority
(ACMA).146 Another zone off the coast of Perth has since been identified. 147
Cable protection zones, however, do not guarantee that human activity
will never disrupt or break a cable. Some limits to the efficacy of cable protection
zones are inherent to the policy. The creation of cable zones increases awareness
of cable location and, accordingly, allows attackers to more easily target the
systems. Cable zones also increase the odds of unintentional breaks caused by
placing more cables in a narrower geographic area. 148
Cable corridors, which create protection zones for cables to be laid, rather
than zones around pre-existing cables, suffer from a similar problem as that of
protection zones. Another factor mitigating the effectiveness of cable protection
zones and corridors is implementation. A lack of proactive monitoring and
deterrence by legal authorities around the zones or corridors may render the
intended protection moot. This lack of deterrence may have been worsened by the
comments of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), explicitly stating that they did
not have a responsibility to monitor, nor supervise, the safekeeping of the cable
protection zones, and that they lacked the resources to do so.149
New Zealand has modeled and improved upon the Australian approach to
cable protection zones. In contrast to Australia’s three zones, New Zealand has
created ten.150 Unlike Australia, New Zealand has taken a proactive approach to
144
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enforcing prohibitions related to the zones. 151 A report by the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute commended the impressive enforcement regime employed by
their neighbors: “Protection officers and Maritime Police [in New Zealand] not
only patrol their zones with ships and helicopters, in some cases they operate for
up to 24 hours a day.”152

FIGURE 5: Map of a cable protection zone in New Zealand. 153
Though these two nations have experienced success with their zones,
zones and corridors are “not generally implemented [by countries around the
world],” despite the fact that “they could reduce unintended cable damage.” 154
Where zones have been instituted and effectively enforced, instances of cable
breaks have decreased to near zero.155 Given the success of these zones, it makes
sense that the two oceanic nations are not alone in having adopted cable
protection zones; other countries with zones include Denmark, Uruguay, and
Colombia.156
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Another approach to reduce the likelihood of cable damage is to increase
the penalties for any such violation. Australia and New Zealand have modeled
this approach by imposing stiff penalties for violating their cable protection zones,
and for causing damage to an undersea cable. In Australia, for example, a person
who “engages in conduct . . . that results in damage to a submarine cable [that is
in a cable protection zone]” may be imprisoned for ten years. 157 Sweden has also
imposed a legal structure likely to deter damage where owners of a cable that
cause damages to another cable must cover the repair costs.158 New Zealand has
also imposed penalties with similar potential to deter damage.159 And as Article
113 of UNCLOS provides criminal sanctions for those who willfully or with
culpable negligence injure undersea cables, China has also adopted cable
protection legislation. In contrast, however, this legislation has done little, if
anything, to deter injurious behavior. 160 Both China’s struggles with reducing
breaks and the inadequacies of Australia’s enforcement regime related to its cable
protection zones suggest that effective enforcement is a necessary condition to
protecting the undersea cable system.
Other less punitive policies to reduce the likelihood of damage to undersea
cables include information-sharing regimes. For instance, Australia and New
Zealand have tasked their governments with providing cable route information
and coordinating with the fishing and maritime industries.161 National security
strategists, such as the Director of National Strategic Studies in the United States,
have acknowledged the importance of information sharing. 162 In other maritime
contexts, national security entities have set up an “unclassified, multinational,
freely shared” automatic identification system to track merchant ships. A similar
system for undersea cables would help reduce cable disruptions.163
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On the whole, laws, regulations, and norms surrounding protection of
undersea cables reflect difficult trade-offs between commercial fishing,
navigation, and undersea cables. Scholars David R. Burnett and Lionel Carter
recommend that any tinkering with this balance be taken on with “[g]reat care,
careful thought, and evidence justifying the need and the risk of intended
consequences [associated with any change].”164 This recommendation, though,
likely does not apply to nations in desperate need of modern legislation and
regulation, including the United States, which Burnett and Carter criticize for its
antiquated “telegraph era statutes based on the 1884 Cable Convention that are
historical relics with little practical utility.” 165

VI.

The United States Legal Framework and its Policy Responses to
System Threats are Insufficient

With limited options through international law, and having failed to
implement best practices gleaned from policies implemented elsewhere, there is a
tremendous amount of room for improvement in the United States’ legal and
regulatory framework pertaining to undersea cables. The time to realize these
improvements is now. Increasing development in the United States coastal and
marine areas threatens the integrity of the undersea cable system. 166 These
activities, if left unregulated, threaten the installation of cables, threaten to limit
the speed of effective and efficient cable repairs, and threaten to detrimentally
alter the course of cables by effectively requiring that they cluster together,
thereby “magnifying[ing] the risks of damage and communications outages across
multiple systems due to particular natural or man-made events.”167
a. The Manifold Federal Agencies with Partial Authority Over
Undersea Cables Hinder the Development of a Comprehensive
Protection Regime
United States laws and regulations fall short in four main ways. U.S. laws
and regulations have fallen short by way of, first, a lack of clarity regarding which
agency or agencies should lead on undersea cable protections; second, insufficient
penalties to deter behavior likely to result in broken undersea cables; third,
insufficient coordination among federal, state, and local governments regarding
specifying and enforcing standards and regulations; and, fourth, as briefly

164

BURNETT & CARTER, supra note 97, at 23.
Id. at 21.
166
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
167
Id.
165

24

Policy Proposals for the United States to Protect the Undersea Cable System

discussed above, private actors, such as Big Tech companies, bearing too much
responsibility for protecting the undersea cable system.
Though the United States Federal Government has recognized the
importance of undersea cables, no agency has taken ownership over the protection
of the system. Importantly, the government has labeled undersea cables as critical
infrastructure.168 This designation suggests that the government would formalize
its institutional response to protecting the system, yet the Working Group
determined that “no U.S. federal agency has transposed th[e] finding [of undersea
cables as critical infrastructure] in practical terms to adopt or enforce cableprotection standards or policies.”169 Instead, as noted by the Office of the General
Counsel within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
“a number of U.S. agencies have authority to regulate the laying and maintenance
of cable off of [the] nation’s shores.”170 This observation is important in two
respects: first, it acknowledges that many agencies have a role in undersea cable
regulations and laws; and, second, it specifies the existence of authority of several
agencies over the undersea cable system, but not an obligation on any one agency
to lead on policy formulation and implementation.
An exhaustive review of the role of each United States federal agency with
ties to the undersea cable system is beyond the scope of this paper. Still, even a
partial overview reveals the fragmented approach taken by the United States
government. NOAA has the authority “to regulate whether and how proposed
submarine cables may be installed in National Marine Sanctuaries.” 171 NOAA, as
discussed below, also plays a role in administering the Coastal Zone Management
Act (“CZMA”).172
The United States Army Corps of Engineers also has authority over
undersea cable laying—at least on the seabed of the outer continental shelf—via
section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899.173 This
authority often entails weighing the national security implications of laying a
specific cable.174 Another agency, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
also has authority over some undersea cables proposed to rest on the continental
168
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shelf.175 The Department of the Interior may also play a role in shaping the nature
of a proposed cable; at times, its specific grant of authority may overlap with that
of the Army Corps of Engineers.176
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) plays a pivotal role in
undersea cable policy and regulation. It has the authority to issue licenses for “any
submarine cable directly or indirectly connecting the United States with any
foreign country, or connecting one portion of the United States with any other
portion thereof.”177 Approval of an undersea sea cable license application is
contingent upon the applicant providing information related to ownership of the
cable, certain reporting requirements, and conditions imposed on each cable
landing license.178
Occasionally, agencies or their sub-units act in informal capacities to
assist initiatives meant to protect the undersea cable system. For example, the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) has partnered with the U.S.
Coast Guard to enforce an informal agreement barring installing wind energy
structures within one nautical mile of a traffic separation scheme. 179 Additionally,
at times, the U.S. Coast Guard will create safety zones around energy exploration
and exploitation facilities on the OCS of the United States. 180
This brief overview of the agencies with some stake in the undersea cable
system reveals a series of overlapping authority. Absent more clarity around
which agency is responsible for protecting the undersea cable system, it is likely
that the current approach will fail to protect the system in the event of significant
disruptions—regardless of the intentionality of the responsible party. At the
federal level alone, overlapping jurisdictions make it harder to implement cable
protection zones and other related legal responses to the threats posed by
unintentional, commercial activity and intentional attacks.
b. Insufficient Penalties for Breaking Cables Fail to Deter
Unintentional Breaks
Underneath the morass of potential agency regulations rests the federal
law prohibiting certain activities related to undersea cables. The main law on the
175
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books serves as an inadequate deterrent to problematic behavior from commercial
actors and state and non-state attackers. According to the Submarine Cable Act,
enacted in 1888, “[a]ny person who shall willfully and wrongfully break or injure,
or attempt to break or injure . . . a submarine cable in such a manner as to
interrupt or embarrass, in whole or in part, telegraphic communication” shall be
liable for as many as two years in prison and/or a fine of up to $5,000. 181 As
reported by the Working Group Report, the penalties associated with causing
damage to a submarine cable are “unlikely to deter negligent or willful damage
and do not even cover the cost of the repair.” 182 The United States has not updated
its penalty amount for cable damage for more than 125 years.183 It is unlikely that
attackers even weigh prison time and fees when planning their acts; this is even
more likely to be the case when law enforcement has few means and a diminished
incentive to effectuate enforcement. 184
There are other laws related to damage caused by commercial actors to
undersea cables lack sufficient deterrent power. Federal law holds fishing vessels
accountable by subjecting fishermen who fail to keep their equipment from
interfering with or damaging submarine cables to punishment; 185 the law specifies
a fine of up to $250 and a prison term for as many as ten days for fishing-related
damage. The law also obligates fishing vessels to remain a minimum distance
from vessels engaged in laying cables or buoys indicating the position of a
cable.186
c. Federalism Undermines a Comprehensive Approach to
Undersea Cable Protection Because States Often have Policy
Priorities that Conflict with Protecting the System
Coastal states influence undersea cable protections and regulations. As a
consequence of the Submerged Lands Act, each coastal state has authority over
the three nautical miles of seabed off their coast. 187 Nevertheless, many states
have yet to take substantial action to protect undersea cable systems. As detailed
by the Working Group Report, “no U.S. federal, state, or local government
agency has promulgated laws or regulations establishing default or minimum
separation distances,” referring to the minimum separation distance between an
181
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existing undersea cable and any other marine activity in the absence of “any
mutual agreement to allow the activity in closer proximity to the submarine
cable.”188 These mandated distances could reduce the frequency of commercial
activities leading to cable breaks; for instance, submarine cables that are a part of
the Internet would have sufficient berth from cables that may be relaying power
from offshore wind farms.
Administered by NOAA, the CZMA also creates a role for states to play in
undersea cable policy. 189 Under the CZMA, the nation’s coastal resources ought
to be balanced between economic development and coastal conversation. 190
Determining that balance must be done in coordination with the states: “no federal
agency may grant a license to conduct an activity affecting a coastal area until a
state concurs or is presumed to concur with the applicant’s certification that a
proposed activity is consistent with the state’s coastal management plan.” 191 This
means that individual states could disrupt efforts by the Federal Government that
either stem commercial activity or foster it. States could act as individual
protectors of cables by creating coastal management plans that require certain
protections for cables.
The ability of states to shape undersea cable policy is not lost on industry
actors. States have become targets of industry groups for regulatory capture.
Former NASCA President Wargo made that clear in a presentation that
highlighted NASCA working with various states to “get more ‘cable friendly’
regulation.”192 As a counterpoint, some states have been more proactive than
others in developing and enforcing spatial planning schemes. 193 Still, a state-bystate effort to address the threats posed by commercial actors to the undersea
cable system likely falls short of the sort of comprehensive policy solution
necessitated by infrastructure of this importance.
Notwithstanding the power held by states to affect policies related to
commercial actors, they lack the sort of coordination to respond to the threats
posed by attackers. Federal actors are better suited to determine the nation’s plan
to reduce breaks caused by attackers—a plan that necessarily raises the sort of
foreign policy questions usually left to the Federal government. At this point,
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though, even the Navy has yet to adopt a formal plan for the protection of the
undersea cable system. 194
d. Private-Sector Stakeholders Have Succeeded in Creating
Patchwork Protections of the Undersea Cable System, but
these Protections are far from Comprehensive
Insignificant legal protections have thus far forced private stakeholders,
such as Big Tech companies like Google, to take the protection of the undersea
system into their own hands. Submarine cable operators, for example, have had a
relatively high degree of success in mitigating damage to cables by burying and
armoring cables, instituting cable awareness campaigns, and compensating
fishermen for any gear snagged by the cables. 195 Cumulatively, these tactics can
reduce threatening commercial activity.
In a similar fashion, regional committees of fishermen and submarine
cable owners have often reached agreements around how to divvy up the
seabed.196 Thanks to these agreements, cables in many areas have been placed
outside of highly fished areas, thereby decreasing the risk of commercial damage
to cables.197 For example, the Oregon commercial trawl fisherman collaborated
with numerous other private companies to create “the Oregon Fisherman’s
Undersea Cable Committee Agreement,” which represented the first effort by two
private stakeholder groups to “discuss, describe, and delineate their shared use of
a community resource—the ocean.”198 Nevertheless, these “self-help”
mechanisms, as described by the Working Group Report, have proven to be
“wholly inadequate” for ensuring the protection required for such an important
piece of the nation’s infrastructure. 199 Moreover, to an even greater extent than
states, private actors are limited in their ability to respond to attackers because
they generally lack the authority to respond to attacks by foreign and non-state
actors.200
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United States federal agencies have helped private actors with some cable
protection projects and initiatives, but only on a reactive basis; it follows that the
agencies, according to the Working Group, place “the burden on the submarine
cable operator[s] to justify a particular method of protection.”201 These ad hoc and
private measures should be replaced by a set of laws and regulations that ensure
the integrity of the undersea cable system in a comprehensive manner—
addressing both attackers and commercial actors.

VII.

The New United States Presidential Administration Should
Adopt Short- and Long-Run Responses to the Threats to the
Undersea Cable System

An initial, speedy review of this paper and topic at large could lead one to
believe that the United States could significantly contribute to the integrity of the
undersea cable system simply by ratifying UNCLOS and creating cable protection
zones. Ratifying UNCLOS would improve the regulatory and legal framework of
the United States related to the system by affording the nation standing in
conversations about amending the Convention as well as providing the nation
with more legal authority to take actions related to the breaking of undersea
cables. Creating cable protection zones, in theory, would indicate that the United
States was adopting a best practice that has shown great results in reducing
undersea cable breaks in nations such as New Zealand, where several zones have
been created and where enforcement is high.
a. Neither Ratifying UNCLOS nor Creating Cable Protection
Zones Will Adequately Address the Threats to the Undersea
Cable System in the United States
In practice, neither ratifying UNCLOS nor attempting to adopt cable
protection zones would make much of a difference in the occurrence of cable
breaks caused by unintentional, commercial activities, or intentional activities in
the United States. Even if the United States ratified UNCLOS and adopted
legislation to implement Articles 113, 114, and 115, the efficacy of that
legislation hinges on effective monitoring; as is the case with cable protection
zones.202 The United States, in the context of effectively monitoring cable break
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activities, is much more akin to China than New Zealand. In other words, like
China, the United States has too many cables and insufficient resources to
effectively monitor cable-breaking activity;203 on the other hand, New Zealand
has three cables, which the nation relies on for all of its international data
traffic.204, 205

FIGURE 6: Undersea cables off of New Zealand (upper) and China (lower) as of
January 24, 2021.206
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The absence of effective enforcement via effective monitoring will render
both UNCLOS-related legislation and cable protection zones insufficient to
maintain and improve the integrity of the undersea cable system. What’s more,
unlike New Zealand, the United States holds a significant position in geopolitics.
It follows that the United States must be far more attentive to the downside of
openly sharing the location of its cables via cable protection zones; identifying the
location of its cables could attract the attention of actors seeking to intentionally
break cables. So, whether the cable protection zones were designed for preexisting or future cables, the issue of actors seeking to cause intentional damage
being notified of the location of the cables still proves problematic.
However, some of the shortfalls of cable protection zones could be
remedied by scaling back the scope of the zones. For example, the British
Parliamentarian Sunak has advocated for smaller zones around the most important
cables and for targeting monitoring resources on these locations. 207 The United
States may struggle to identify such narrow zones, given that the majority of
cables are privately owned and the manifold cables lining the coast of the United
States. What criteria would justify affording some cables greater protection than
others? Some factors, such as the amount of Internet traffic carried on specific
cables, may help identify the most important zones for protection. The process for
creating a specific list of factors and outlining specific zones would likely be
subject to costly and time-intensive litigation. The vulnerability of the undersea
cable system to threats of unintentional, commercial, and intentional breaks
requires a faster policy response.
Note also that this paper is not actively opposing the ratification of
UNCLOS, but only suggests that doing so would have a limited impact on
protecting the undersea cable system. The fact that U.S. states would still retain
significant authority over the shallow waters prone to breaks caused by
commercial activity reinforces the limited efficacy of UNCLOS.208
Finally, the politics of ratifying UNCLOS or adopting cable protection
zones could impose a substantial barrier to realizing either goal. Though
bipartisan support for ratifying UNCLOS has existed since at least the early
2000s,209 oppositional political forces as well as political inertia have thwarted
ratification. Similar political coalitions could likely mount a successful campaign
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against cable protection zones as well. One such coalition member could be
NASCA, which has already proven capable of pushing back against cable
protections that did not meet its standards. 210
b. Gathering and Sharing Information Related to Undersea
Cable Threats Will Immediately Increase Deterrence by
Making Attribution of Breaks Easier
Given the importance of the severity and likelihood of getting caught
breaking a cable to reducing the frequency of breaks, the United States should
review the remaining policy options through a lens that promises the greatest
deterrent effect to actors likely to unintentionally or intentionally break cables.
With that in mind, the United States should focus on three policy goals:
information gathering, information sharing, and increasing penalties.
Regarding information gathering, the U.S. should institute a new
requirement to include sensors on all undersea cables and should pursue
international agreements and domestic regulations to monitor ship locations.
Undersea cables are “located hundreds if not thousands of miles from anywhere
or anything that can detect and monitor the presence of a hostile maritime actor,”
based on Sunak’s research. 211 Consequently, Sunak recommends that nations
mandate cable laying companies to “place relatively cheap sensors that detect
sonar frequencies near key undersea infrastructure and along cable routes. If the
sensors were tripped, they could alert nearby coast guard or navy assets.” 212
In the context of the United States, the FCC could realize this information
gathering strategy by mandating that cable operators include their use of sensors
in any license for an undersea cable. This small step would turn the agency’s
licensing process into an effective tool for improving the nation’s response to the
primary dual threats to the system; of course, there would need to be follow up
efforts to ensure that license recipients installed the sensors when laying their
cables. Private owners of these cables would likely comply with this sensor
requirement if they knew that the resulting information would help them recover
any costs associated with repairing a break in their cable.
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In the event that the United States is unable to rally an international
coalition to create an information gathering system or pass similar domestic
legislation, the private sector may be able to adopt its own standards to achieve
the same effect. The ICPC, for instance, could mandate that its members include
sensors on their cables as a condition of their membership. Of course, the ICPC
may seek federal funds to help cover the costs of such a requirement; asking
Congress for money would likely be easier than asking the gridlocked body to
pass meaningful legislation. This approach would benefit from being easier and
faster to implement. However, an international treaty or domestic law would
likely be easier for the state and federal authorities to enforce, which, as discussed
in Section V, is imperative to an effective regime. With the protection of the
undersea cable at stake, both short- and long-term solutions ought to be pursued.
However, the sensors are implemented, to ensure a high likelihood of
identifying the person or entity responsible for a break observed by a cable’s
sensors, it is essential to locate the ship nearest to the cable at the time of the
break. Australia and New Zealand offer a policy response that, if expanded, could
supply that information. In those countries, ships within cable protection zones
are required to broadcast their locations to the relevant Coast Guard. 213 This
obligation ensures that the Coast Guard can effectively track when ships near and
cross cables. The United States should expand this requirement to all boats within
its territorial seas, EEZ, and continental shelf—doing so would not interfere with
the rights or freedoms of any State to sail in such waters.214
On the high seas, the United States should reach agreements with other
nations to delineate specific monitoring responsibilities; given that the vast
majority of breaks occur within territorial seas and EEZs, it is most important that
the United States work with other nations to observe their respective waters. 215
With this sort of international monitoring, it would be possible to cross
reference any break triggered by the cable sensors against the location database.
The geographic and data-keeping responsibilities of nations in this monitoring
arrangement could be specified in future trade agreements or through international
bodies such as NATO or the UN.
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The exchange of sensitive information between private and public
stakeholders will not be realized without an information sharing regime in place.
By way of example, Congress passed the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
to create a legal safe harbor for companies subjected to cyberattacks to exchange
information with government stakeholders. 216 A similar piece of legislation could
provide companies that share information related to their undersea cables with
certain benefits, so as to increase the odds of them installing the sensors discussed
above and sharing trigger events with the government in a timely fashion. For
example, the legislation could make the provision of repair costs to the private
owner of the cable from the party responsible for the break contingent upon the
cable company being a part of the information sharing agreement.
This agreement would also provide the government with assurances that
the private companies would not divulge government information collected via
national security systems, such as information collected through the Integrated
Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS). The IUSS is the Navy’s “array of fixed
and mobile acoustic arrays that provide its primary means for detecting
submarines.”217 By placing the location of submarines and ships into a database
with sensor-gathered information related to cables, the odds of identifying the
culprit for any cable break would drastically increase. This extensive cooperation
would make even the most sophisticated attacker think twice before intentionally
breaking a cable and would give pause to commercial actors every time they
considered dropping anchor. This legislative solution, though, would take time. It
follows that congressional hearings on this topic should commence sooner rather
than later.
With information gathering and sharing addressing the likelihood of being
caught, increasing the fines associated with breaking a cable is the last remaining
aspect of the deterrence equation. The United States must update the penalties
associated with intentionally damaging, attempting to damage, and negligently
damaging undersea cables. Consider that breaching undersea cable laws and
regulations in New Zealand or Australia carries fines of more than US $68,410
and US $342,004, respectively.218 Comparatively, the corresponding fine in the
United States is just $5,000. 219 Although this increase will likely only add to the
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deterrence of commercial actors, those actors are still the most likely to cause a
break. So, the increase is likely to be a meaningful policy intervention.
This base level fine should be increased and tiered based on several
factors. For one, large corporate actors guilty of breaking a cable should face a
higher fine than commercial fishermen; this differentiation would help mitigate
any political pushback from the organizations representing the latter group.
Additionally, the fine should increase based on the level of culpability; for
instance, a safe harbor could be created for commercial entities that install
specific equipment to assist with location monitoring of ships. Finally, those
entities that have repeatedly broken cables should face continually greater fines as
their number of violations increase. And, as mentioned above, the culpable party
should have to directly compensate the cable owner for the repair costs, so long as
the cable owner is a part of the information sharing regime.

VIII. Conclusion
Those nations that are part of UNCLOS should form a coalition to amend
Article 113 to remedy the provision’s current practical effect. More specifically,
as currently written, “when a submarine cable beneath high seas or EEZ is broken
or damaged by intentional or reckless conduct, in many cases no crime has been
committed under any State’s laws” because Article 113 requires States to have
incorporated the article into their national laws and most states have not done so
based on research by Beckman. 220 This same coalition should also establish
universal jurisdiction over persons who intentionally destroy or damage
submarine cables; doing so would reflect the reliance of so many States on this
system, as well as the increased threat of terrorist acts against the cables. 221
Other ideas worthy of consideration by the international community
include laying more “dark cables,” creating a new international treaty penalizing
international interference with undersea cables, and mandating minimum levels of
CLS security in that same international treaty. Sunak recommended each of these
strategies, as well as several others, in his report. 222 Dark cables refer to cables
that do not appear on publicly available maps. By staying out of public
knowledge, the cables are made more secure against intentional sabotage or
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espionage efforts. Sunak envisions using tax incentives to encourage cable owners
to create these clandestine cables.223
Sunak also calls for the creation of an entirely new international treaty
specifically tailored to meeting the needs of the undersea cable system. 224 Though
the prospects of getting the international community to agree on much of anything
these days seem dim, this narrowly tailored treaty could bring a sufficient number
of major stakeholders together to build momentum toward a new treaty. If
legislation incorporating Article 113 into domestic law is any indication of a
willingness to take proactive steps to protect the undersea cable system, then even
China may be supportive of such a treaty. Of course, private stakeholders would
likely sign on as well if the treaty helped them more expeditiously repair their
cables. This treaty should also include efforts to inventory and coordinate the use
of cable repair resources. Given that there are around 59 cable ships in the world
and only half stand ready to conduct emergency repairs, it is essential that these
resources are used deliberately by the international community. 225 This would be
a marked improvement on the current approach to sharing repair resources:
private contracts developed around geographic regions.226 An international
agreement could also incentivize the creation of more such ships, especially if
treaty signatories could provide extra funds to ships that reach breaks in the most
timely fashion.
Though CLS protection was not the focus of this paper, Sunak makes a
convincing case for making CLS a focus of international collaboration. Right
now, CLS tend to be concentrated in a few areas in coastal states.227 Oftentimes,
these CLS have little to no security, making them easy targets for attackers. An
international agreement could help create standards for keeping these sites safe
from threats, ranging from climate change to terrorists. Notably, the FCC could
also institute such standards through its licensing authority.
No single policy is capable of mitigating all of the threats facing the
undersea cable system. Still, some policies seem more likely than others to deter
the actions most commonly associated with breaks in undersea cables. These
policies ought to be pursued first, though efforts to form a broader, more
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comprehensive international treaty related to undersea cables should also get
underway.
The United States, given the transition to a new presidential
administration, is well suited to lead on efforts to reform domestic laws related to
undersea cables and respond to attackers and commercial actors. The Biden
Administration must recognize the centrality of the undersea cable system to
America’s national security and economy; foreign actors have already come to
that realization and are ready to exploit the nation’s vulnerabilities.
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